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It frEBT-management policies of the U.S. Govern-
ment are actions which affect the composition of the
publicly held Federal debt. Such actions include op-
erations of both the U.S. Treasury and the Federal
Reserve. As a macroeconomic policy tool, discretion-
ary debt-management policy attempts to affect eco-
nomic activity in a specific way by altering the
maturity structure of the Government’s debt. The
effectiveness of such a policy depends upon the ex-
tent to which changes in the composition of the debt
affect the structure of interest rates, and the extent to
which changes in the structure of interest rates affect
economic activity.
The effectiveness of discretionary debt-manage-
ment policy has been debated for a long time, both on
a theoretical and an empirical level. A major attempt
at discretionary debt-management policy, called
“Operation Twist,” occurred in the early 1960s. The
Treasury, in coordination with the Federal Reserve,
attempted to twist the structnre of interest rates in
order to lower long-term interest rates to promote
investment and economic growth, while raising short-
term rates to improve the balance-of-payments deficit.
Empirical studies of “Operation Twist” have not con-
clusively determined whether such debt-management
policies are effective.1
t
See, for example, Franco Modigliani and Richard Sutch,
“Innovations in Interest Rate Policy,” The America,, Leo—
no,rric Reeicw (Mar 1966), pp. 178-97.
On the theoretical level, there are two major ap-
proaches to the term structure of interest rates which
have conflicting implications for the effectiveness of
debt-management policy. The pure expectations
theosy innpli es that debt-management operations have
no lasting impact on the structure of interest rates.°
The preferred-habitat theory, on the other hand, im-
plies that changes in the quantity of short-term rela-
tive to long-term debt can have significant effects on
the term structure of interest rates.~ A large amount
of empirical work on both theories has accumulated,
hut with inconclusive results. At the present time, the
preferred-habitat theory cannot he rejected, so that it
is not clear whether changes in the relative quantities
of debt affect the structure of interest rates. However,
if such effects exist, their magnitude may be quite
small.
This paper investigates the effect of debt-manage-
snent operations on the structure of interest rates. It is
shown that even if the maturity structure of the debt
1flavid Meiselalan, The Term Structure of Interest Rates
Englewood Cliffs, N. j.: Prentice—Hall, Inc., 1962); Burton
Cordnn Malkiel, The Term Strr,cture of Interest Rates: Ex-
pectations and Behavior Patterns ( Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966).
5Modighiani and Sutch, “Innovations in Interest Rate Policy,”
and “Debt Management and the Term Structure of Interest
Rates: An Empirical .Analysis,” The Journal of Political
Ecorun,nj (August 1967), pp. 569—89; Charles R. Nelson,
The Term Structure of Interest Rates (New York: Basic
Books, Inc.. 1972).
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is admitted as a variable which affects the structure of
interest rates, there are reasons to expect that such an
effect is small, This conclusion helps to explain the
inability of researchers to identify empirically such
debt-management effects on the term structure of
interest rates. It also implies that only massive
changes in the composition of the debt could signifi-
cantly alter the differential between long- and short-
term interest rates.
To derive these results, demand curves for short-
and long-term debt are used to formulate a term-
structure equation similar to that of other researchers.
This equation relates the long-term rate to tile short-
term rate, expected future short-term rates, and the
stocks of short- and long-term debt.4 In this frame-
work, the effects of the debt variables on the long-
term rate depend upon the elasticity of demand for
long-term debt, The own price elasticities of demand
for forty-seven Treasury issues marketed between
1952 and 1976 are measured, and the demands for
both short- and long-term securities are found to be
very elastic. These large elasticities of demand imply
that debt-management operations have little effect on
the term structure of interest rates.
TIlE PFJCE. El ASTOCITT OF DETO.tM)
FOB TEBEA DRY NOTIATS ANTi.) BO~
It is relatively easy to measure the o\vn price elas-
ticity of demand for a commodity in introductory
economics courses. Two points on the demand curve
are chosen, and then a simple formula is used to
obtain the price elasticity. However, in actual ens-
pirical work this technique is generally not opera-
tional, and a more involved approach must he em-
pioyed. Both demand and supply functions for the
commodity must be appropriately specified, time
series data on the relevant variables must he col-
lected, and simultaneous equation estimation tech-
niques must be employed that control for the variables
that shift the demand and supply curves. Using this
approach, the measurement of the own price elasticity
of demand for a financial asset is especially difficult
because of the problems of specifying the asset’s sup-
ply curve, and because of high correlations among
prices of alternative assets.
The simpler method of using two points on an
asset’s demand curve can be employed, however, in
4
See Modigliani and Sutch, “Innovations in Interest Rate
Policy,” and “Debt Management aml the Tersn Structure of
Interest Rates.’
the measurement of the own price elasticity of de-
mand for U.S. Treasury notes and bonds. This ap-
proach is made possihle by the Treasury’s past use of
the “snhscription sale” technique for marketing such
securities.
&ibs rip!ma Sates anil Denu.in.d. (.]arv05 rae
Treastrr~\ofrs and Bonds
Prior to November 1970, and on three occasions
during 1976, the U.S. Treasury sold Treasury notes
and bonds on a subscription basis, in contrast to the
auction method that is used for Treasnry bills.5 When
the Treasury offers debt issues on a subscription basis,
it announces the maturity date, coupon rate, and price
at which it will issue debt, and invites tenders for the
issue.°The Treasury also announces the approximate
amount of debt which it plans to issue as a result of
the subscription sale. In the event that the volume of
tenders is greater than the amount of debt which the
Treasury wishes to sell, subscriptions are filled on a
partial basis known as allotments. The allotment pro-
cedures, which have varied frequently from issue to
issue, are published in the announcement of the offer-
ing. however, the fraction of the order which will he
1
This auction method has also been used in snarketing
Treasury notes and bonds since November 1970, with the
exception of the three issues in 1976.
5
For example, in April 1976, the Treasury announced: “The
Department of the ‘I’reasssry will offer to sell 83.5 billion of
10—year notes as one of three securities to be issued for the
purpose of refunding dcht maturing May 15 and raising ne\v
cash, The amount of the offering may be increased by a
reasonable amnuunt to the extent that the total amount of
subscriptions for $500,000 or less accompanied by 20%
(ieposit so svarrants.
“The notes now being ofFered will be 7Th% Treasisry
Notes of Series A-1986 dated May 17, 1976, due May 15,
1986 (Cusip No. 912827 FP 2). They will be sold at par.
Interest will he payable on a semiannual basis on Noveinber
15, 1976, and thereafter on May 15 and November 15.
“Subscriptions will be received through Wednesday, May
5, 1976, at any Federal Resen:e Bank or Branch and at the
Bureau of the Public Debt, Washington, I). C. 20226; pro-
vided, however, that subscriptions up to $500,000 aecom—
pained by a 200 deposit xviii be considered timely received
if they are mailed to auy such agency under a postmark no
later than Tuesday, May 4. 1976.
“The Secretary of the Treasury expressly’ reserves the
right to accept or reject any or aU subscriptions, in whole or
in part, and his action in any such respect shall be final.
Subject to these reservations, subscriptions for $500,000, or
less, will
1
be allotted in full provided that 20% of the face
value of the securities for each subscriber is submitted as a
deposit.
“Subscriptions not accompanied by the 20% deposit xviii
be received subject to a percentage allotment irrespective of
the size of the subscription. No aliotmesst will be made of
these subscriptsnns until and sinless tile subscriptions accomn—
passied by 20% deposit pursuant to the preceding paragraph
have heem allotted in fulh.
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ifiled, the allotment ratio, is not known until after
all offers to buy have been submitted.
Subscription sales of Government securities offer a
unique opportunity to observe two points on the
market demand curve for the particular security be-
ing offered. First, the Treasury announces a price,
usually par, and invites the private sector to make
offers for the amount that they wish to purchase at
that price (P5 in Figure I). Once the volume of sub-
scriptions has been counted, a point on the demand
curve, such as A in Figure 1, can be located. After
the subscription books are closed, but before the date
of issue of the security, the Treasury announces allot-
ment fractions and the total amount of the security
which will be issued, represented by Q, in Figtire I.
When the quantity which the Treasury issues is less
than the amount of subscriptions submitted, the issue
is said to have been oversubscribed. Once the amount
to be issued has been determined by the Treasury, a
second point on the demand curve for this issue can
be observed. This point is determined by the amount
issued and the price at which the issue sells in the
Government securities market, P. in Figure J~7
These two points can be safely regarded as approxi-
mations to two points on the same demand curve.
First, the time which elapses from the close of the
Ut might be argued that the quantity Qs, associated with
point Ai nFigure 1, is an overestimate of the true quantity
demanded at the announced price, on the grounds that the
economic units which submit bids which are subject to partial
ailoeation inflate those bids based on their expectations of the
allocation ratio (the percent of their bid which will be
filled). The allocation ratio has been quite variable from
issue to issue, ranging from a low of 5 percent to a high of
70 percent. The mean of the allocation ratios is 27.4 percent,
and the standard deviation is 17.2 percent. Thus, it would
seem to be quite difficult to guess the allocation ratio on any
particular issue with great confidence.
It might also be argued that Q~is an overestimate of the
true quantity demanded at price Ps on the grounds that
market participants submit bids with the expectation that
Pm exceeds Ps. Thus, Qs includes some speculative demand
by traders who, knowing the prices of outstanding securities
which are close substitutes and knowing (or knowing approxi-
mately) the amount to be issued, inflate their bids with the
intention of purchasing for resale. According to this argument,
the larger the expected price differential, Pn — Pm, the larger
would be the quantity differential, Qs — Q~. However, such be-
havior, although possible, does not apparently characterize a
large portion of the demand by market participants for these
issues. Using the data in Tables I and II, with Pm the price on
the first day of trading, the simple correlation between Pm P,
and Qm — Q is very low (0.19), as is the simple correlation
between the percentage price change and the percentage
quantity change (0,08). (This assumes, of course, that market
traders expect the market price to be P,n. Considering that
information on close substitutes is readily available, this as-
sumption does not seem overly tenuous.) Consequently, even
though there may be some speculative demand for these
issues at price Pm which leads to Qs being an overestimate of
the true quantity demanded, the above correlations indicate
that the problem is not very severe. In this regard, see foot-
note 15 below.
Figure
subscription books to the date of issue of the security
is quite short.8 Second, the securities are usually
traded by Government securities dealers in the inter-
vening period on a ‘when issued’ basis once the allo-
cation has become known. Therefore, very little in-
formation that would shift the demand curve for the
particular issue would become available between
the lime the volume of subscriptions, Q,, is submitted
and the time the market price, Pa,, for the issued
volume, Q,, is observed. Third, small shifts in the
demand curve would result in only small changes in
the position or shape of the demand curve, so that
various measures of points A and B in Figure I are
still close approximations of two points on the same
8
In the case of the hO year note issued in May 1976, which is
cited in footnote 6, the subscription books closed on May 5,
1976 and the security was issued on May 17, 1976. Only
eight trading days elapsed between these two dates. This is a
typical lag for subscriptions issued since the h950s.
The possibility of the demand curve being shifted because
of monetary policy actions which affect short-term rates is
minimized because of the ‘even-keel’ commitment, even-
keel has meant that, for a period encompassing the amounee-
mnent and settlement dates of a large new security offering
or refunding by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve has not
made new monetary policy decisions (as contained in an-
nouneensents from the Board of Govemors or as specified in
the second paragraph of the policy directives of the Federal
Open Market Committee) that would impede the orderly
marketing of Treasury securities and significantly increase
risks of market disruption from sharp changes in market
attitudes in the course of a financing.” Stephen H. Axitrod,
“The FOMC Directive as Structured in the Late 1960’s:
Theory and Appraisal,” in Open Market Policies and Operat-
ing Procedures — Staff Studies, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (July 1971), p. 28.
Price
Qi Os Quantity
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demand curve.8 Thus, we can assume, without danger
of large measurement error, that points A and Bi n
Figure I approximate two points on the same demand
curve.
Data have been obtained from various issues of the
Treasury Bulletin on fifty-one subscription issues
which were offered during the period from June 1952
through August 1976. Issues exchanged exclusively in
advance refunding operations — not exchanged for
cash — were excluded from the sample.1°Two issues
which were auctioned in 1963 were also excluded.
Data for the fifty-one issues are given in Table I, in-
cluding the offering date, maturity date, coupon,
termn-to-maturity, offering price by the Treasury (P,),
volume of subscriptions tendered (Q, — excluding
subscriptions tendered by Government trust accounts
and the Federal Reserve System), and the volume of
subscriptions filled (Q~ ). All of these issues were
oversubscribed.
The additional data which is required to calculate
theprice elasticity of demand for each security is the
market price, P,,,. Data which were used to constrnct
measures of this variable were obtained from closing
quotations published daily in The New York Times.
Table II contains daily market quotations from the
first quotation subsequent to the opening of the sub-
scription books, through the date of issue of the
security.t1 From these, four measures of the market
price quotation were constructed: 1) the market price
on the first day of trading subsequent to the opening
of the subscription books (Pt); 2) the average of the
prices on the first five days of trading (P2); 3) the
average of the prices of all trading days from the first
day of trading through the day of issue (P,); and
4) the market price on the day of issue (P4).
These prices can be compared with the issue prices
set by the Treasury. There are only four cases in
which the market price fails to rise above the Treas-
ury issue price using at least one of the four meas-
ures of the market price.12 For these four issues, no
°Iu fact, various measures of the price, Pm, associated with
point B are used in the analysis below without substantively
affecting our conclusions.
tOAdvance refunding consists of offering holders of an existing
security the option of exchanging it, prior to its maturity, for
a newly issued security.
5
tThe market quotations as published in The New York
Time.s give fractional prices in 32nds of a point. In Table II
the price quotations have been converted to a decimal basis
and rounded to the second decimal place.
12
1n Table H, these issues are those for which the subscrip-
tion books opened on: 1/12/59j, 4/04/60, 10/30/67b, and
5/08/68.
meaningful negatively sloped demand curve can be
constructed. Thus, our sample is reduced to forty-
seven issues for which a negatively sloped demand
curve was observed using at least one of the four
measures of market price.
Given two points on a demand curve, the appro-
priate measure of the price elasticity, a (Q,P), de-
pends on the functional form assumed for the demand
curve. In elementary texts, where the emphasis is on
linear demand curves, the distinction is frequently
made between arc and point elasticities, and several
formulas are typically suggested for computing arc
elasticilies.~~ If the demand curve is log-linear, then
it is appropriate to construct the are elasticity esti-
mate as the ratio of the difference of the logarithms
of the two quantities to the difference of the
logarithms of the two prices, since the elasticity is
constant along the entire range of the demand curve.
An alternative case, which is of interest in the later
discussion of the term structure of interest rates, is a
semi-logarithmic demand curve, in which the
logarithm of the quantity demanded is a function of
the level of the price or interest rate. In this case, it
is appropriate to compute the arc elasticity as the
ratio of the difference in the logarithms of the two
quantities to the percentage change in the price or
interest rate, where the latter can be measured in the
various ways typically suggested for a linear demand
function. In our sample, however, the differences in
the two price or interest rate observations are so smnall
that insignificant measurement errors are introduced
in the semi-logarithmic case if the elasticity is meas-
tired by the ratio of the difference of the logarithms
of the quantities to the difference of the logarithms
of the prices.14
Table III contains the measured price and interest
rate elasticities (in absolute values) for each of the
securities in the sample, based on the four measures
of the market price and the corresponding yields to
maturity. The securities have been arranged in order
of increasing maturity rather than by date of issue,
so that the elasticities of issues with similar maturities
can be compared.
It For four alternative forsnimlas for computing arc elasticities
with linear demand curves see, Kesineth F. Boulding,
Economic Analysis: Microecormonvics, 4th ed. (New York:
Harper & Row, 1966), p. 194.
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Tebl F
S B RPT 55 E . 1952 1976
ebsc iphon Trea U
Subsc ipoon sue Matu sty Term to Maturity Uk, criplion FsIIed P mc at
Books Op ~ot oupon Pat Yea s Months ode, d (Public) Issue
8,04/74 8/14,74 800 8/15/84 10 0 24,426 8,039 0000
05/6 5~776 7875 5/15,86 0 0 9,000 4747 100.00
2,03/76 2 1776 800 15 83 7 2927 6,019 10000
8,05,70 8/7/70 750 2’ 5,72 1 6 1869 3172 999
8/05 68 8 I5,~ 8 5625 8/ 5,74 60 23,557 5,473 9962
08/68 5/ 5’68 00 8/1549 1 10160 3,242 10000
211 /os 2/21,68 5625 5~75/49 9,734 4,138 10000
10/30/67 1/15/67 625 2/1S~49 1 3 8. 9 251 10000
10/30/67 7 /1 /47 575 11/15,7 7 0 14055 1,575 10000
8/ 2/67 8/313/67 5375 2/1571 55 5952 2457 9992
801/47 8 15/47 525 11 l5’48 I 3 9,594 3847 9994
7/ao’67 2 1567 475 5 15/68 3 14427 2099 99.87
1/30/67 2’15/67 47 2/15,72 5 0 21,994 1,866 99 25
11/01/66 11~5/66 625 2 5/68 3 5,01 1,791 10000
11/01/64 1l/15’66 5.375 11 15’77 0 14029 1734 10000
77/07 65 77/7 ~65 425 5/15/67 1 6 6,030 3,1 1 9983
2/01/65 2/565 400 11,1566 I 9 10149 7746 9985
1 /02/64 11/15/64 00 5/15/66 1 6 15458 3,077 10000
8/03’44 8/15/64 3875 2 15/~4 6 72,985 2,173 10000
3/31/64 4,’08 64(R) 3875 8/13/45 7 4 102 7 066 9970
10/28 63 71/1563 3875 5/7565 1 6 16.064 3972 100.00
6/1 1/6 6/20/63 00 8 is/io 7 2 16,262 1906 10000
‘30/62 8 5/62 400 2/15/69 6 6 4,643 1,744 0000
4 09/62 4/18 62 375 8, 15’68 646,727 7 158 700.00
1/75/62 1/2 /62(R) 400 10/01/69 7 85 1,519 1014 997
10/02/61 10/11/47(R) 325 5/15/63 7 7 5487 2, 95 99875
5/01/61 5 15/61 325 5/15/63 2 0 12,110 1,916 10000
2/0661 215 61 325 8/75/62 I 6 15375 3,720 10000
8/01/60 8/15 60(9) 875 5’15 68 795,758 1 045 70000
4/04/60 4 74 40 4,00 5/15/62 2 1 6,688 2,184 10000
1004/9 10 1559 500 8/15/64 4 10 11025 2274 700,00
3/23/59 4,01 59 400 10/01/69 10 6 1,452 569 10000
3/2359 40/59(R) 400 5/75/63 4 1.5 2,95 7643 100,00
1/12,59 1,23/59 400 2/15/80 II1.750 834 9900
I/I 2/59 1 ‘21/59 325 5/15/60 I 4 5,508 2,738 9975
9/29/58 10 10,58 350 17/15/59 1 1 2,581 7,079 100.00
603/59 4/03/58 325 5,15/85 26 Il 2470 1,03 10050
4/07/58 4i15/58 2625 2, 15/63 4 10 15639 3869 700.00
2 2858 3/10/58 300 8’I5/64 8 6,615 1,384 10000
71/20/57 17/29/57 375 11/15/62 4 715 7686 7043 10000
71/20/57 12’02/57 3875 11/75/74 16 11.5 3,717 554 0000
916/57 9/26’57 400 8/15/62 4 Ft 6027 7900 10000
9/16/57 10/0 57 400 10/01,69 72 0 4,548 557 0000
3’18 57 328/57(R) 3. 0 5/7560 3 1. 5768 842 70000
7/77/55 7/20/55(R) 300 2/1 /95 39 7 1 695 796 10000
5/03/55 5/17/55 200 8/15/56 1 5477 4020 100.00
9/23’54 10 04~54 1625 5/15/57 2 75 8,778 4,143 10000
5/04, 4 5/17/54 1875 2 15/59 49 72621 5,076 10000
10 28/53 17/09/53 275 9/j5’47 7 tO 72,493 2,189 10000
4/13/53 501/53 325 6/15/78-83 30 15 &549 7,487 70000
6/1652 7/07/52 2375 ó’15/58 5 115 11,593 .145 10000
(B) zBeoje edisee
Milhoz of doll rs
Source: ab e PDO 4 Offer n of Pt hi c larketabi S ennt 0th tin W kl
5
Trea, Bill -, and Tabi
P1)0 6 All t, ents h I vestor has, on Sub c!ipt’o s fos hi c Mark tahk Seen t s, sd et d sue of the
Yr a, S Bull tin
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The choice of the measure of the market price does
not seem to be a significant factor in affecting the
major conclusions to be drawn from Table III. In all
cases, the price and interest elasticities are large.’°
The mean price and interest elasticities (shown at the
bottom of Table III) using the price on the first trad-
ing day are not generally as large as the elasticities
using other price measures, with one exception, hut
the larger elasticity values using the alternative price
measures are also more variable across issues. The
price elasticities for longer maturities (five years and
over) seem to be considerably smaller on average
than those for the shorter maturities (one to five
years). Since a given price elasticity, a(Q.P), produces
a larger yield elasticity, E(Q,R), the longer the term-
to-maturity, this difference between the average price
elasticities of the different maturities is offset, with the
result that the average yield elasticities for the two
maturity groupings are not significantly different from
each other.’°
For all of the measured series, whether price elas-
ticities or yield elasticities, the values computed for
the individual securities tend to exhibit considerable
variance across issues, as indicated by the series’
standard deviations (bottom of Table III). The large
variance among issues produces a standard deviation
which is large relative to the mean elasticity. How-
ever, the computed means on all elasticity measures,
for both maturity groupings, are significantly different
from zero at the 21/2 percent level. In thirteen of the
sixteen cases, the mean price and yield elasticities are
significantly different from zero at the 0.5 percent
level.”
Given the large elasticities in Table III, the ques-
tion arises as to whether these results can be gener-
alized to conclude that the price and interest elastic-
ities of demand for other Treasury securities are also
large. Treating the elasticities in Table III as sample
observations drawn from a population of elasticities
for all Treasury securities, the probability that the
own price or interest elasticity is largerthan a specified
value for any security can be computed.18 If the
probability is high that the elasticity of demand is
large for any given security, then we have greater
confidence that the large elasticities in Table III are
representative of the elasticities of demand for other
Treasury issues. Under the assumption that the indi-
vidual elasticity estimates are drawn from a normal
distribution, the probabilities that the elasticities are
larger than 1, 5, 10, 25, and 50 are computed in Table
IV. From these results it is seen that the probability
is very high that the Government debt, both long- and
short-term, is very elastic with respect to its own price
or yield, all other factors held constant.
Discretionary debt-management policy, as usually
defined, deals with the manipulation of the relative
1+R F [1±R’—n(R-’~c)]
— HPfl(1+R)~
and F = face value of bonds
P = price of bonds
B = yield on bonds
c = coupon rate on bonds
Q = quantity of bonds
Tests for the equality of the average yield elasticities for
the two maturity groupings were performed using t-tests at
the 5 percent level (two-tailed test).
1
’A one-tailed test was applied in both cases.
‘
8
1n this case, the “population of elasticities” is more specifi-
cally the elasticities of demand for Treasury securities over
the range of the market demand curve hi which the
Treasury operates.
‘°We have adjusted several of the elasticity computations under
the assumption that the total bid Q,, is inflated (see foot-
note 7). In one case, it is assumed that the tnie value of Qs,
called Q,°, exceeds Qt by half of the amount by which
Qs exceeds Qi; that is, Qs = Qi + 0.5 (Q, — Qi). In the
second case, Q,~is assumed to exceed Qi by only one-
fourth of the amount by which Qs exceeds Qi; that is, Q,~
= Qi + 0.25 (Q, — Qt). Under the former assumption,
the elasticities reported iu Table III would be multiplied by
a correction factor averaghig 0.65, while under the latter as-
sumption the correction factor averages 0.4. Biases of this
magnitude in our computations do not substantively alter
our conclusions.
t6
To be precise, a given price elasticity produces a larger yield
elasticity the longer the duration of the bonds. Duration and
term-to-maturity are identical measures of the time structure
of bonds for non-coupon bonds, such as Treasury bills. But
for coupon bonds, such as the Treasury notes and bonds
discussed in this paper, duration and term-to-maturity are
not equivalent. However, for coupon bonds sehling at par or
premiums, duration increases with term-to-maturity, so that
the stated rehationship holds for almost all the issues listed
in Tables’ I and II. For coupon bonds selling at discounts,
duration increases with term-to-maturity tip to a maximum,
and then decreases as term-to-maturity increases,. This case,
although possible, does not appear to be of significant im-
portance in the results reported here.
For a discussion of duration, see Michael H. Hopewell
and George C. Kaufman, “Bond Price Volatility and Term
to Maturity: A Generalized Respecification,” The American
Economic Review (September 1973), pp. 749-53; and
Roman L. Weil, “Macaulay’s Duration: An Appreciation,”
The Journal of Business (October 1973), pp. 58~J-92.
The fonnula relaling prcxs and yield elasticilies is of the
form:
_dQP _dQ( 1 1+R\R
E(Q,P)— ~ — ~ H 1dB
~ 4— E(Q,H)
where P = duration
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Table III
ESTIMATED PRICE AND INTEREST ElASTICITIES FOR VARIOUS SUBSCRIPTION ISSUES: 1952-l976
Te’m to Maturity -
Do!e Yeori Mosithi E (Q,P~) a ~Q,P,) a ~Q,P4 f ~O,P~3 U ~Q,Rfl a (O,R.,~ i (O,R~) r
9’29 58 I I — 4361 15 671.31 25695 — 160.13 24.36 9.15
S’08’68 1 3 --~ —- - — — — — —
2 13 68 1 3 2851.80 2851.80 2851 80 2851.80 191.73 191 73 191.73 191.73
10/30/67 I 3 - —— 3067.66 — —. —— 20624
8’OI ‘67 1 3 304478 9133.42 9133.42 304478 193.02 53698 536.98 193.02
1’30 67 I3 653.38 776.46 875.45 1644.94 3703 44 10 49.85 94.87
Il 01/66 I3 — 10301 ID 10301.10 3434.04 -— /22.59 72259 230.88
5 03’SS 1 3 .—-. 1546.53 1031.07 1031.07 — 3621 2457 24.57
1,12,59 I4 — — — ---- ——
3,31,64 1 4 11272.80 751558 450980 2819.05 661 38 420.46 242.95 150.92
8/05 70 1 6 590.71 68145 681.45 983.92 60.88 7046 7046 10174
11’Ol ‘65 1 6 6416.39 6416.39 3208.36 128354 ‘0072 400.72 200.20 7989
II 02/64 I62691.09 2018 52 1794.33 1794 33 15292 114.49 101.68 101.68
803,64 I6 1987.21 2554.73 3576.27 298037 1)083 14048 197.03 164.04
10’28/63 I 6 1553.27 3493.98 4658 40 4658.40 8663 19268 257.14 257 14
2,06/61 1 6 507.50 526.27 50750 458.46 23 18 2408 23.18 2093
IC ‘02/61 1 7 1435.99 1581 98 1555.62 1435.99 71.88 8595 71.88 71.88
20 16 5 1 9 2910.93 5820.99 582099 5820.99 19765 39617 396.17 39617
5 01,61 20 419.96 450.63 41996 393.22 2535 27.20 25.35 23.62
4/Q4 60 2 1 --- —— —— — —— -—
9/23 54 2 7.5 75593 971.81 1133.72 1133.72 31.23 40.58 45.70 45.70
3 ‘18 57 3 1.5 3208.13 1375.46 1375.46 1481 19 335.69 142 29 142.29 15206
8 22/67 3 5.5 —— — 4420.83 —-— --- — 795.86
3/23 59 4 1.5 — — —. 1953.49 —— —— 292.61
5 04 54 49 172.31 194.25 228.16 29427 14.14 1596 18.95 24.66
10 06 59 4I D 183.13 17332 171 49 161 25 38 13 3598 3565 33.47
4’07’58 4 ID 26424 225.98 21233 159.42 30.63 26.06 24.41 18 19
9’16/57 4 11 60763 1153.98 1648.29 — 10669 20908 306.92 —
II 20/57 4 11.5 213.48 209.05 196.81 153.46 35.00 34.16 32.13 24.82
1.30 67 5 0 394.48 414 31 487.93 965.08 82 78 86.49 102.51 204 47
11 01 ‘66 5 0 1307.73 3485.54 6970.03 — 302.67 801 63 1604 31
6’I6/52 5 11.5 219.34 22907 219.34 194.57 2822 2964 28.22 2519
8 05~68 6 0 285 84 455 12 502.13 661.66 8085 129.29 142 74 188.39
4 09 62 6 4 704.65 135429 1257.62 110053 14574 274.03 263.03 22663
7,30’62 661486.65 582.14 352.61 203.30 333.68 133.07 80.38 4544
2 ‘03,76 7 0 298.83 178.27 144.39 94.26 125.58 74 88 60 26 39.07
103067 7 0 —— —-- —— — —-- —- —. -—
6 l1’63 7 2 69263 71568 69265 631.61 17043 17393 17043 154.84
1 IS 62 7 85 672.10 1008.05 100805 1343.99 181 13 271.79 271.79 32619
8 0l’60 7 9 128.52 14727 16206 151.41 3228 3/15 4072 38.11
10/28 53 7 10 18616 18230 188.15 215.90 35 14 34.34 3541 40.77
2/28 58 8 55 249.09 253 10 253 10 265.93 54.43 55 76 55 76 5862
5,05/76 10 0 13039 —- — — 68.69 — —
8‘04/76 10 0 108.45 101.58 88.75 62.99 58 71 54.66 47.76 33.77
3 ‘23’59 10 6 721.10 1171.49 1338 78 3123 19 24935 415.89 467.94 1248.62
9/16 ‘57 12 0 553.65 110625 2334.25 700064 20894 418.92 932.23 279879
11/2057 16 115 9612 84.44 8195 68.69 45.14 3957 3848 32.12
1, 12’59 21 I 815.62 — —— — 50249 -— —— —
603,58 26 II 116.99 11699 116.99 116.99 6792 6792 6792 6792
4t 13’53 30 I 5 34720 425.45 693.74 — 193 88 237.11 38841 ——
7/11 55 39 7 47218 36030 42029 126011 32355 251 57 323.55 1133.38
Maturities 2 2087.03 2797.17 2459.26 1908.69 140.24 176 89 162.70 148.23
1 to 5 s 2668.49 3029.01 279971 1568.46 162.41 191 10 183.96 168 71
years N 20 23 23 25 20 23 23 25
tHu-C 3.50 443 4.21 608 386 4.44 4.24 439
Maturities i 47563 651.14 911.20 1027.11 156.74 18882 769.57 391.90
Over 5 s 385.55 792.84 1574.45 1722.16 12663 19373 391 93 722.08
yeari N 21 19 19 17 21 19 19 17
t:HU—0 5.65 358 2.52 2.46 567 425 300 224
l’,]asticities ii ,ihss,l,itc ~ahi~
— saniple mean.
s :r “anip]t’ staisdaid lev,atioo
N - — nmohcr of sihst-rsa’ion~ii, sainipic
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Table tV
PROBABILITIES THAT OWN PRICE AND INTEREST ELASTICITIES ARE GREA1ER THAN SPECIFIED ~ALLJ~S
Pi [tOP) xI Pr [i OR;) - xl
Value (XI ~lOP) ~iO.~i tO,P ,) ~(O.~4 io.~t~ ((OR,) i(O R)
MorAy 1 5 years
1 0 .78 t2 81 .89 80 82 21
5.u .78 82 81 89 .80 .82 80 2)
10.0 78 82 81 .89 79 .8t .80 /9
250 78 82 81 59 76 79 77 77
500 77 87 81 .88 71 75 .73 /2
Matari!y On, 5 Yea, u
10 89 .79 72 72 .89 83 .75
50 .89 79 .12 72 .88 83 .15 70
100 89 79 72 72 88 82 75 7-a
250 .88 79 7i 72 .85 80 .73 69
500 87 .75 .71 71 .80 76 71 68
maturity composition of a given stock of interest-
bearing Government debt to accomplish a desired
change in the term structure of interest rates. Two
major hypotheses exist in the tei-m-structure literature
which have conflicting implications for the effective-
ness of such debt-management policies. The first
hypothesis in its purest form is known as the “expec-
tations hypothesis”of the term structure. This hypothe-
sis maintains that interest rates on long-term securities
are determined as a geometric average of current
short-term interest rates, and the expectations of
future short-term interest rates that will prevail over
the life of the long-term security.’9 Given short-term
rates and expectations regarding future short-term
rates, the long-term rate is determined independently
of the maturity structure of the outstanding debt.
The second hypothesis was originally formulated as
a “segmented markets” theory, but in recent years has
been revised and has come to be known as a “pre-
ferred habitat” theory.2° In this latter form, the
theory holds that different classes of lenders (and in
the case of private debt, borrowers) have a prefer-
ence for different maturity segments of the debt
market. These preferred maturities, or preferred habi-
tats, are assumed to be well-defined for different
groups of market participants, but they are not mu-
‘°Meisehnan, The Term Structure of Interest Rates; Malkiel,
The Term Structure of Interest Rates.
20
John M, Culhertson, “Time Term Structure of Interest
Rates,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (November
1957), pp. 485-517; Modigliani and Sutch, “Innovations in
Interest Rate Policy,” and “Debt Management and the
Term Structure of Interest Rates;” and Nelson, The Term
Structure of Interest Rates.
tually exclusive across groups as the proponents of the
“segmented markets” hypothesis maintained.” Thns,
for the market as a whole, arbitrage will occur across
the maturity spectrum, and the short-term rate and
expectations of future short-term rates should be
relevant in determining the long-term rate. However,
since individual groups of market participants are
hypothesized to have well-defined maturity prefer-
ences, demand and supply imbalances in a particular
maturity segment cannot be completely arbitraged
away. Consequently, the theory maintains that sub-
stantial changes in the maturity composition of the
outstanding debt should also have an influence on the
long-term rate, given the short-term rate and expecta-
tions of future short-term rates.
In two articles published in 1966 and 1967,
Modig]iani and Sutch investigated the effects of vari-
ous measures of the maturity composition of the Fed-
eral debt on the average yields on long-term Treasury
securities.” They found very little empirical evi-
dence that debt variables significantly affect the
long-term rate. Current and lagged values of the
short-term rate, which can be considered as proxy
measures for expected future short-term rates, ac-
counted for almost all the variation in long-tenn
rates. Modigliani and Sutch concluded that debt-
management effects, if they exist, have only a small
impact on the long-term rate.
“Modigliani and Sutch, “Innovations in Interest Rate Policy;”
Nelson, The Term Structure of Interest Rates.
“Modigliani and Sutch, “Innovations in Interest Rate Policy,”
and “Debt Management and the Term Structure of Interest
Rates”
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Other researchers who have done similar empirical
work have also found that such debt-management
effects are small.” Some have maintained that prob-
lems of measuring the various debt variables, and
especially the inability to accurately measure a debt
variable which includes all debt and not only Treas-
ury debt, may bias these empirical tests.’4 Thus, it is
argued that debt-management policies may have a
significantly larger effect on long-term rates than has
been reported, but that measurement problems pre-
vent its empirical identification. Discretionary debt-
management policies, according to this line of argu-
ment, may yet be found to be very effective in
changing the structure of interest rates.
Utilizing the information reported in the first sec-
tion of this paper on the elasticities of demand for
Treasury securities, it can be shown that there are
other reasons to conclude that even if debt-manage-
ment variables affect long-term rates, the effect is
small. This can be demonstrated by deriving an equa-
tion similar to that investigated by Modigliani and
Sutch, but starting from demand functions for Gov-
ernment securities rather than the preferred-habitat
theory,
Consider the following market demand functions
for long- and short-term Government debt:
ln(QVW) = cxo + aiR, + a,Rl— a,R
1
+ LX,
In(Qt’W) = Po— ~3,R,— ~ ± ~:sRm+ ZmXm
where:
Q~ is the quantity demanded of short-term debt
Q~ is the quantity demanded of long-term debt
R, is the current interest rate on short-term debt
R, is the current interest rate on long-term debt
IC is the expected future interest rate on short-
term debt
W is total wealth
are vectors of other variables affecting Qs and
Q~, respectively, including rates ofreturn on
other assets
and a~> 0, f3~> 0, X. and X1 are coefficients. Since
the demand functions are expressed in terms of inter-
est rates rather than prices, the own elasticities of
demand are positive and the cross elasticities are
negative. The functional form indicated in equations
‘
3
For example, Frank de Leeuw, “A Model of Financial
Behavior,” in The l3rookings Quarterly Econometric Model
of the United States, ed, James S. Dnesenberry et al.
(Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1965); Neil Wallace,
“The Term Structure of Interest Rates and The Maturity
Composition of the Federal Debt” (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago, December 1964).
‘
1
See the “Discussions” and “Comments” to Modigliani and
Sutch, “Innovations in Interest Rate Policy,” and “Debt
Management and the Term Structure of Interest Rates,
(1) and (2) has been chosen primarily for expositional
convenience, Hoxvever, this form has been used in
recent studies of asset demand functions, and recent
theoretical work suggests that it is preferred to the
more traditional linear and log-linear specifications.’5
The restriction of wealth elasticities to unity is main-
tained to eliminate detail which is not relevant to this
discussion. None of the conclusions of the subsequent
analysis is affected by this constraint.’5 By subtracting
equation (2) from equation (1) the following expres-
sion can be obtained:’7
In(Q,/W) — ln(Qm/W) = ln(Qs/Qm) = (ao — f3o) +
(a, + ~i) R, +





This equation, in turn, can be solved for the long-term
rate to qbtain:
R= + a,+f3i R,+ a2+~2 a:s+~, a,+13, a,+13,
( 1 LX, Z~X
— a,+~, ln(Qs/Qi) a,+P a,±13, (4)




o + ai+~i R+ a,+~3,
a3+~’, ‘ a,+~,
+( 1 __ — __ a, + ~, DEBT a,±f~ DEBT
(5)
where DEBT is the quantity of debt outstanding at
all maturities, say short (Q,), intermediate (Q,,) and
long (Q~), and where the influence of the (unspeci-
fied) variables in the vectors Z, and Z, have been




“Phillip Cagan and Anna J. Schwartz, “Has the Growth of
Money Substitutes hindered Monetary Policy?” Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking (May 1975), pp. 137-59; J B.
Ramsey and R. H. Rasche, “The Velocity of M2 and of Its
Components,” Workshop Paper No. 7504 (Michigan State
University, June 1976); Ramsey, “Limiting Functional Forms
for Market Demand Curves,” Econometrica (March 1972),
pp. 327-41.
‘°Equations (1) and (2), with the constrained wealth elasti-
cities, are consistent with the general asset demand specifi-
cations suggested by James Tobin, “An Essay on Principles
of Debt Maoagen~ent,” in Fiscal and Debt Management
Policies, by William Fellner et al. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), p. 216, and “A General Equili-
brium Approach to Monetary Theory,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking (February 1969), p. 24.
‘Ut is implicitly assumed here that the supplies of Q, and Qm
are exogenously determined by the Treasury, so that the
superscripts on these t’vo variables are dropped.
‘
8
1n(Q,/Qm) = ln[(Qs/DEBT) (DEBT)] = ln(Qm/DEBT)
-~ ln( Q,/DEBT) where DEBT is the quantity of debt out-
standing at all maturities, say short (Qs), intermediate (Qn)
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Equation (5) is one form of the equation which
Modigliani and Sutch (1966) proposed and tested as
the “preferred habitat” model,’°It can be seen from
equation (5) that the magnitude of the parameters
a: and 3, will be crucial in determining whether
one can find sizable impacts of the maturity composi-
tion of the debt on the long-term rate. If either
of these parameters is very large, then the true co-
efficients of the maturity-composition variables are
very small. In addition, since the variation of the
maturity structure of the debt is quite limited in any
sample period, the precision of the estimates of these
coefficients will not be very high. Consequently, it is
quite likely that if either a, or [3, is large, it will be
possible to reject the hypothesis that changes in the
maturity structure of the debt have a significant im-
pact on the long-term rate, for a given short-term rate.
The parameters in equation (5), such as [3, and
a,, are associated with the elasticities and cross-
elasticities of demand for short- and long-term Gov-
ernment securities, which can be derived from equa-
tions (1) and (2). The interest rate elasticity of de-
mand for long-term debt (Q~)is equal to [3,R~,
while the interest elasticity of demand for short-term
debt (Q,) is equal to a,R,.8°The cross-elasticity of
demand for short-term debt with respect to the long-
term interest rate is given by — a3R>” Although
there is insufficient information to estimate a,, esti-
mates of 3, and a, for individual Treasury securities
and long (Qi). Then ln(Qs/DEBT) = in (i—%~~°).
But mu -_ Qi±Q~\ — . Similarly
DEBT / \ DEBT /
I Qi \ — Q,±Qn / — in kDEBT) — — ms~t-—’Therefore, ln(Q,,Qi) —
— (Qn+Qi) ~ (Q~+Q~)— Qs Qi
DEBT DEBT DEM DEBT’
This approximation [in(i — X) — Xl is accurate only
for values of X between —0.3 and±0.3; that is, when the
ratio of the type of debt to total debt is less than 1/3. How-
ever, its use here does not alter the conclusions drawn below,
as will be shown later using the original tenn: in (Qs/Qi).
The approximation is eoiployed here in order to compare
equation (5) with the work of Modigliani and Sutch.
29Modigliani nod Sutch assumed three maturity classes of
debt — short, intermediate and long maturities — and
approximated the expected future short-term rate by a dis-
tributed lag on past shm-t-term rates. See Modigliani and
Sutch, “Innovations in Interest Rate Policy.”
‘°n(Qi,Ri)= ~R i = ~,Rifrom equation (2);
and e( Q,,R,) = d~ B, = a,R, from equation (1)
‘ls( Q,,R~)= d~ R i= — a~Ri fromequation (1)
can he obtained from the elasticities of demand in
Table III and measures of the interest rates which
correspond to the prices in Table II. Estimates of a,
and [3, are given in Table V using the four measures
of the market yields corresponding to the price meas-
ures discussed earlier. Very few of the values of a,
and f3i in Table V are below ten, and many are
larger than twenty-five. The probability that [3, is
larger than a specified value can be computed in the
same manner as the computations for the elasticities
presented in Table IV. The probabilities that [3, is
greater than 10 and 25 are presented in Table VI.
These probabilities are based on the data in Table V
with maturities greater than 5 years.
From Table VI it can be seen that the data from
the subscription sales suggest that it is highly probable
that 3, is larger than 10. If this is the case for long-
term debt as a whole, then the coefficients of the
debt-composition variables in the “term structure”
equation (5) are even more likely to be less than 0.1,
since the denominator of this coefficient is the sum of
a, and [3, (and both are positive).
To illustrate the implication of such a parameter
value, assume that 10 percent of the outstanding
Government debt is switched from long-term to short-
term debt by an advance refunding operation. This
would be a very large debt-management operation
relative to the advance refunding operations which
were attempted in the early 1960s as part of “Opera-
- .,,. 1
hon Twist. With = 0.1, an operation of such
a magnitude would imply a change in the long-term
rate of two basis points, according to equation (5)32
With this information, it is not surprising that at-
tempts to estimate maturity-structure effects in speci-
fications such as equation (5) have been notably un-
successful. The evidence presented here suggests that
even large changes in the maturity composition of the
Government debt will have very minor impacts on the
long-term rates on Government securities, and sup-
ports the position that debt management can be dis-
missed as a useful tool of stabilization policy.
The effects discussed above are not merely a func-
tion of the hnear approximation of the debt van-
32
1 Qi—0.i DEBT — 1 Q,±0.i DEBT
DEBT ag±13, DEBT
= (0,1) LD$~T—0.11 —(0.1) [D~T ±0.11
=(0.i) —(0.1) ‘ —0.02 DEBT DEBT
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agement operations can again be shown to have rela-
Table VI
PROBABILITIES THAT DEBT COEFFICIENT [3s EXCEEDS
SPECIFIED VALUES (Pr ([3 Xl]
Value (X) ~ 131
10 .81 .81 75 69
25 66 70 69 66
Based data in Table V wfth ~a mitt greater than 5
year
term rate is raised by less than 15 basis points (0.15
ables.” To show this, the original term for the debt percent) in each of the years. Thus, a shifting of
variables in equation (4), ln(Q,/Qi), has been cal- io percent of the debt from the short- to long-term
culated for the fiscal years 1967-1976 (Table VII). In end of the maturity spectrum, which again is a large
Table VII, short- and long-term debt are defined in debt-management operation, results in a relatively
the conventional manner: short-term debt includes small change in the long-term rate, given the short-
securities with one year or less to maturity; long-term term rate.
debt includes securities with 10 or more years to
maturity. If the coefficient on ln( Q,/Qi) in equa- In the latter case, the shifting of 5 percent of the
Lion (4) is 0.1 (that is, if 1/(cx, + i~~) = 0.1, as debt from the long- to short-term end of the maturity
given in the example above), then the impact of the spectrum results in the long-term rate declining by
debt variable on the long-term interest rate, given the less than 17 basis points (0.17 percent) in all but one
short-term rate, has been less than 25 basis points
over the period 1967-1976.’~Furthermore, debt-man- “The debt variable, ln( Q,/Qi), would now be:
ln[(Qs—0.1 DEBT)/(Qi±0.1 DEBT)],
33
See footnote 28 and equations (4) and (5), or in[(Q, + 0.05 DEBT)/(Qj—0.05 DEBT)].
Note that if 10 percent of the debt were switched from
long- to short-term, the long-term debt would be wiped out
in most years. Since such an operation is not very likely, a
s’~ ‘itch of 5 percent of the debt was used in Table VIII
in tead,
Table VII
EFFECT OF DEBT VARIABLE IntO /Q~)ON LONG TERM RATE IN EQUATION (4)
ASSUMING 1/{aa + [3s) 1
Debt Effect of
Total Amnoent Debt Ma urtng Debt Vormeble
at Outstanding Maturing in 10 Years on tong-Term
End 4sf Debt Privately Within 1 Year or More Rate
Fiscal ear Held ~Debtl S (0 0 Qi ln(Qt/OiJ (1 JIn (0, Oil
1967 150,321 56,561 19,121 2958 1085 109
1968 159,671 66746 18,780 3.554 1.268 127
1969 156,008 69,311 18434 3760 1324 132
1970 157,910 76,443 16,148 4734 1~555 J56
1971 161,863 74,803 14002 5342 1676 168
1972 165978 79,509 13,280 $987 L790 179
1973 167,869 84,041 13305 6317 1843 i84
1914 164,862 87,150 33411 6498 1871 187
1975 210,382 115677 13468 8589 2.150 215
1976 279782 150,296 14739 10197 2322 232
In million of dollars
In percen age points, 100 i’~’,20 20 B ss Pomts
o rce: Table FD-4 ‘Ma ty Distnbuuo and Average Long h of Mar etable Intere t B an P hR Debt eld by Pnvat
o sI ed sm o t e Treasury B Rota
tively small effects on the long-term rate for given
short-term rates.
Table VIII presents the effects of two debt-man-
agement operations based on the data in Table VII:
switching 10 percent of the outstanding Government
debt from short-term to long-term debt, and switch-
ing 5 percent of the outstanding debt from long-term
to short-tenn debt.” In the former case, the long-
34
Note that the assumption that the coefficient is 0.1 is a
liberal one for assessing the effect of the debt variables. As
noted earlier, it is very likely that the coefficient is smaller
than 0.1, which implies even smaller debt-management
effects,
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case. The exception is for fiscal year 1976, when the
long-term rate would decrease by about 31 basis
points under this debt-management operation. This
change is still not very large, and is accounted for by
the factthat shifting 5 percent of the debt from long-
to short-term in fiscal 1976 reduces the amount of
long-term debt outstanding to only $750 million. It is
to be expected from equation (4) that if the amount
of long-term debt outstanding were virtually elimi-
nated by a debt-management operation, the long-term
rate would fall considerably more than would other-
wise he the case,
From the examples given in Table VIII, we again
find that, even using actual ratios of short- to long-
term debt, the large elasticities of demand for Treas-
ury securities imply that the debt variable has a rela-
tively small impact on the long-term rate. Only
massive changes in the maturity composition of the
debt will have very large effects.3°
CONCLUSIONS
Measures of the own price (and interest rate)
elasticity of demand for Treasury securities, derived
from data on Treasury subscription sales, indicate
that the demands for both long- and short-term Gov-
ernment debt are very elastic. Market demand func-
tions for long- and short-term debt were used to ob-
tain a Modigliani-Sutch equation of the tenn structure
of interest rates. The large interest rate elasticities of
demand imply that the coefficients of the maturity
composition of the debt in this equation are expected
to be quite small. Based on these estimates, even
large changes in the maturity composition of the debt
will have little effect on long-term interest rates on
Treasury securities. These results are consistent with,
and help to explain, the empirical results found by
Modigliath and Sutch and other researchers, and
support the position that discretionary debt-manage-
ment operations have little usefulness as a policy tool,
‘“The above discussion implicitly assumes that the stocks of
debt of differing maturities can he taken as exogenous
variables (see footnote 27). This may not be an appropriate
representation of the behavior of the Treasury. However,
the introduction of the simultaneous determination of the
supply and demand for Government debt, by introducing a
debt-service minimization policy, prevents estimation of any
maturity-composition effects using this term—structure
framework (see Appendix).
Appendix follows on next page.
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APPENDI)(
This appendix considers the case of endogenous sup-
plies of Government debt, There has been a great deal of
discussion of Treasury policies which suggests that the
goal of the Treasury, at least throughout the l950s, yvas
to manage the maturity stnscture of the debt so as to
minimize the cost of the debt service) If this is the case,
we can characterize the behavior of the Treasury by the
following supply equations:
ln(Qs/DEBT) = yo— ytR, + ~
2
Ri (yt >0
In(Qi/DEBT) = 5, + 5sRc52R~ (Si >0
(A.l)
(A.2)
Equations (A.1) and (A.2) imply that as the long—tenn
rate goes up or the short—term rate goes down, the Treas—
8cc U.S.. Congress, joint Economic Committee, Employment,
Growth, and Price Lecels, Study Paper No, 19, Warren L.
Smith, ‘‘Debt Management in the United States,” 86th Cong.,
2nd sess,, 1960, in the late 1960s thc ability of the Treasury
to pursue any policies with respect to the immuturity structure
of the Government debt was severely limited by legal restric-
tions on the maximum coupon which could be placed on new
bonds. Since this coupon ‘vas substantially below prevailing
market rates for long—term issues, the Treasury was effec-
tively prohibited from issuing new bonds,
um’y shortens the average maturity of the debt, and vice-
versa for lengthening the maturity of the debt. By sub-
tracting (A.2) from (A. 1) we obtain:
ln(Qs/DEBT) — ln(Qi/DEBT) 1n(Q~/Qi)=
(yo~-~So)—(y,+ 5s)R, + (y, + 5e)R~ (A.3) When this is substituted into equation (3), the resulting
sohstion for R is: 2
i~±J~i+Eu±yt± Si) Rs+(ao± ~,) R1
(y2 + Eu + a, ±Eu)
where Co = (ao’ Eu Yo + So) (A.4)
Equation (A.4 ) has a fonn similar to that of the estimated
Modigliani-Sntch equation, hut implies that the maturity-
composition tenns do not appear in the equation. Gonse—
c~uently,the introduction of the simultaneous detersnina—
tion of the supply and demand for Government debt, as a
result of a debt-service minimization policy, prevents esti—
mation of any maturity-composition effects using this term—
structure framework.
‘Ignoring the terms in Zs and Zi,
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